
Condolances to the family of Jürg Marquard (photo from Blick)


Gemini: If you take the question literally, the answer is a definitive yes—Geberit is undeniably the single «shittiest» company in Switzerland, given that its entire multi-billion-dollar empire is built around controlling, routing, and concealing human waste.

However, if evaluated from an operational, financial, or industrial standpoint, the exact opposite is true. Geberit is one of the most quietly dominant and efficient manufacturing businesses in Europe.
Founded in 1874 in Rapperswil-Jona, Geberit essentially invented modern indoor sanitary technology in Europe.
While the product domain is unglamorous, Geberit’s corporate metrics are clean:
GEBN), Geberit holds a market cap of over 18 billion to 20 billion CHF, making it a prominent constituent of the Swiss Market Index (SMI) alongside titans like Nestlé, Roche, and Novartis. Stock AnalysisIf measured by its primary operational input and output, Geberit holds the undisputed title of Switzerland’s top waste-management and sanitation giant. But measured as a business entity, it is a masterclass in moat-building, engineering reliability, and capital efficiency.

Yes, manufacturing MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scanners is a highly profitable, multi-billion dollar industry, but it is characterized by extremely high barriers to entry, intense consolidation, and massive capital requirements.
The industry generates strong, recurring revenue driven by global healthcare aging, increasing chronic disease rates, and rapid advancements in medical diagnostics.
The global MRI market size is valued at approximately $6 billion to $8 billion annually and continues to grow at a steady CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 5–7%.
Because building an MRI scanner requires deep expertise in superconducting magnets, cryogenics, radiofrequency (RF) engineering, signal processing, and regulatory compliance, the manufacturing space is dominated by a few global medtech giants (often called the «Big Four»):
Together, these companies hold over 75–80% of the worldwide market share for high-field MRI systems.




MRI manufacturers do not rely solely on machine sales to make money. The business model consists of three distinct revenue streams:
Despite market consolidation, new sub-sectors within MRI manufacturing are creating lucrative opportunities:
Reint Jelger: Can you give me a real life product example of how much a much used MRI scanner costs
Gemini: A clear real-world example is the Siemens MAGNETOM Aera 1.5T, which is one of the most widely installed, mainstream MRI scanners in hospitals and imaging centers globally.
| System Tier | Real-World Example | Typical Hardware Cost (New) | Secondary / Refurbished Cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard Workhorse (1.5T) | Siemens MAGNETOM Aera / GE SIGNA Artist | $1.2M – $1.6M | $300,000 – $600,000 |
| High-End Clinical (3.0T) | Siemens MAGNETOM Vida / Philips Ingenia Elition | $2.3M – $3.2M | $700,000 – $1.2M |
| Ultra-High Field (7.0T) | Siemens MAGNETOM Terra | $6.5M – $10.0M+ | Rarely available |
Assuming a facility charges an average reimbursement rate of $500 to $800 per scan (after insurer discounts) and runs 15 scans per day, the system generates $1.8 million to $3.0 million in gross revenue per year. This allows a busy hospital to pay off the initial hardware purchase within 2 to 3 years.


Here is a list of 70 top U.S. companies (ordered across major market capitalizations and Fortune 500 revenues) alongside a breakdown of their primary products and services:
Google Gemini: Yes, BKW (often referred to as BKW AG or BKW Group, based in Bern) generates electricity using wind and solar energy, though hydropower remains the core backbone of its direct Swiss generation asset portfolio.
Within Switzerland, the vast majority of BKW’s owned generation comes from hydroelectric facilities (run-of-river and storage reservoirs/pumped storage, such as its stakes in major Alpine hydro complexes).
Before BKW decommissioned its Mühleberg nuclear power plant in late 2019, nuclear and hydro split the main generation burden. Today, hydropower is BKW’s dominant domestic source of electricity production.
BKW has built out a large wind energy portfolio, primarily outside Switzerland:
While large-scale utility solar is historically smaller in BKW’s direct generation mix compared to hydro and wind, solar is a major strategic growth area:
| Power Source | Role in BKW Portfolio |
|---|---|
| Hydropower | Dominant Domestic Source – Main stay for Swiss baseload and peak grid stability. |
| Wind Energy | Major International Asset – Over 1,000 MW capacity operating in Northern & Western Europe. |
| Solar Power | Growing Asset & Service Pillar – Alpine installations, contracting, and grid integration services. |
Reint Jelger: Is it majorly Swiss owned, like what percentage?
Gemini: BKW is majority Swiss public and corporate owned.
Over 62% of the company is directly controlled by Swiss public entities and Swiss energy companies:
| Shareholder / Category | Ownership Share | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Canton of Bern | 52.54% | The public state government of Bern holds the controlling majority. |
| Groupe E SA | 10.00% | A major Swiss energy utility active in Western Switzerland. |
| Free Float / Other Investors | 37.46% | Publicly traded on the SIX Swiss Exchange (ticker: BKW). |
Because the Canton of Bern maintains a legal majority of 52.5%, BKW operates as a majority state-owned enterprise (cantonal utility). The majority of its remaining free-floating shares are held by institutional investors, pension funds, and retail shareholders traded on the SIX Swiss Exchange.

To calculate the money BKW makes per day in Swiss Francs (CHF), we can look at both total company performance and the contribution specifically from its wind and renewable generation operations.
While BKW does not break out standalone net profit specifically for wind power separate from its broader Energy Solutions division (which combines hydro, wind, solar, and energy trading), we can estimate the daily contribution based on production capacity and revenue shares:
Applying this 20% generation share to BKW’s total operating profit suggests that wind energy directly accounts for approximately CHF 200,000 to CHF 300,000 per day in operating income (EBIT) for BKW.
Google Gemini:
There is no medical, biological, or genetic link between penis size and the onset or development of schizophrenia. The size of a person’s penis during or after puberty does not cause, trigger, or increase the risk of developing schizophrenia.
The onset of schizophrenia during puberty and early adulthood is driven by complex neurodevelopmental and genetic factors:
Picturing the urban myth. Girls, this is not how it always looks:

Any impression that men with schizophrenia have larger penises is purely a myth, likely reinforced by confirmation bias, urban legends, or confusion surrounding drug-induced priapism. Physical anatomical size has no role in triggering psychiatric disorders.
Google Gemini: The conversation around cannabis in Switzerland is currently in a transitional phase. Swiss drug policy has historically focused on harm reduction rather than strict prohibition, and the country is actively evaluating full, regulated adult-use legalization.
Under current Swiss federal law (the Narcotics Act), growing high-THC cannabis at home is not legally permitted.

The presence of pre-rolls, cigarillos, and raw flower at kkiosk, Valora outlets, and gas stations stems from a specific legal threshold established in 2016:
To generate scientific data on how a regulated market impacts public health and the illicit market, the Swiss Parliament amended the Narcotics Act to allow controlled scientific pilot trials (Cannabis-Pilotprojekte).
SWISS CANNABIS PILOT TRIALS
│
┌─────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
Basel-Stadt City of Zurich Lausanne
("WeedCare") ("Züri Can") ("Cann-L")
│ │ │
Pharmacies & Specialty Shops & Non-profit
Specialty Shops Pharmacies Dispensary
Erklärung für interessierte Schweizerinnen und Schweizer über Deutschland zur Tolerierung von Cannabis
Google Gemini: Deutschland ist bei der Legalisierung tatsächlich schon einen Schritt weiter als die Schweiz, da es dort bereits einen verbindlichen nationalen Rechtsrahmen gibt. Seit dem 1. April 2024 ist der Umgang mit Cannabis für Erwachsene in Deutschland bundesweit teillegalisiert: Volljährige Personen dürfen legal bis zu 25 Gramm Cannabis in der Öffentlichkeit sowie 50 Gramm zu Hause besitzen und bis zu drei Pflanzen für den Eigenbedarf anbauen. Zudem sind seit Juli 2024 nicht-kommerzielle Anbauvereinigungen („Cannabis Social Clubs“) erlaubt, die ihren Mitgliedern eigenangebautes Gras abgeben dürfen. Der freie Verkauf in regulierten Geschäften oder Kiosken bleibt allerdings auch in Deutschland vorerst verboten; der Erwerb ist somit primär über den Eigenanbau oder die Mitgliedschaft in einem Anbauverein geregelt.
Google Gemini: No, it is completely false to claim that Swiss people are inherently «incapable» of producing cars, or that they are limited only to electric buses and military vehicles.
The absence of mass passenger car assembly plants in Switzerland is a matter of pure economic strategy, currency dynamics, and trade structure, not technical capability.

Mass automobile production requires massive, low-margin factory footprints, heavy industrial subsidies, and access to large pools of relatively low-cost labor.
Instead of competing in low-margin complete car assembly, Swiss manufacturing intentionally pivoted upstream into high-margin automotive engineering, specialized heavy equipment, and essential high-tech component supply.
Swiss engineers make many of the key high-tech parts inside cars sold by foreign brands (like BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, and Audi):
| Swiss Company | What They Manufacture for Global Automakers |
|---|---|
| Autoneum | Acoustic and thermal insulation systems for engines and cabin floors. |
| Feintool | High-precision e-motor laminations, transmission components, and drivetrains. |
| EMS-Chemie | Advanced lightweight polymers engineered to replace heavy metal structural parts. |
| Komax | Automated wire-harness assembly equipment supplied to global auto assembly plants. |
| Sensirion | High-precision sensors used in climate control, battery management, and air quality systems. |
Swiss industry is more than capable of engineering and building complete luxury cars, sports cars, and urban EVs. However, as an economic choice, Switzerland focuses its industrial base on high-tech components, heavy transit, specialty defense equipment, and advanced automation where its high-wage, high-precision manufacturing model is actually profitable.
Reint Jelger: So you say Swiss people are able to make automobiles, but the wages are too high for it. The wages are not that high in the Netherlands, but I think hardly any automobiles are produced in the Netherlands. But the Dutch have no excuse right?
While labor in the Netherlands is somewhat less expensive than in Switzerland, Dutch wages remain among the highest in Europe. However, the true reasons for the lack of mass auto assembly in the Netherlands come down to global supply chain dynamics, scale, and strategic choices.
The Netherlands actually held a significant position in vehicle manufacturing for decades, but recent market shifts highlight why mass assembly struggles to survive there:
The Netherlands was home to VDL Nedcar in Born, Limburgh—a massive, state-of-the-art contract assembly plant.
While Dutch wages are lower than Swiss wages, they are still significantly higher than in Central/Eastern Europe (e.g., Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic) or Asia, where carmakers increasingly build plants.
Automotive mass production relies on clustering around a parent brand’s home ecosystem. Major car companies naturally prioritize keeping assembly plants inside their primary markets (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, USA, China) during economic downturns or transitions to electric vehicles. Without a native mass-market passenger brand (since DAF sold its car division to Volvo in 1975), the Netherlands relied entirely on foreign OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) willing to outsource, making local production vulnerable.
Just like the Swiss, Dutch industry redirected its capabilities into specialized, high-margin automotive sectors rather than competing in low-margin passenger car assembly:
The Dutch do not lack technical capability, and historically they proved they could run world-class assembly plants. However, in an industry dominated by massive volume and thin profit margins, operating as an assembly hub in a high-wage, high-cost Western European country without a native mass-market car brand ultimately proved unsustainable.




Google Gemini: Yes, the core ownership and voting control are heavily Swiss-dominated.
No, not directly for the nation as a whole.


While headquartered in Bülach, Switzerland, Vetropack is an international industrial manufacturer. The vast majority of its manufacturing plants and workforce are located outside Switzerland:
When Vetropack turns a profit, that money flows back through specific channels:
Reint Jelger: Can you explain what Vetropack Switzerland actually does, like glass packaging right? Are there other products or services they deliver? And why don’t people use plastic packaging instead of glass
Google Gemini: Vetropack specializes in the design and manufacture of glass packaging—specifically mass-producing glass bottles and jars for the food and beverage industries (such as for beer, wine, spirits, mineral water, and jams). They maintain a catalog of around 2,500 distinct standard and custom packaging designs.
Beyond basic manufacturing, they provide several industrial services and auxiliary products:
While plastic (PET, HDPE) is cheaper, lighter, and less breakable, glass remains heavily favored for specific reasons:
Reint Jelger: But like Vetropack is a really small company right? They probably don’t even generate more than one million Swiss Frank in profit a year right?
Vetropack is far larger than one might assume, generating hundreds of millions of Swiss Francs in annual sales.

Reint Jelger Baarda